Don’t Let the Brexit Be a Smokescreen for Broad New Spying Powers for Law Enforcement

In the second reading was, the Prime Minister statement

There is going to be bulk connection: committee members were given classified evidence of the merits of such collection — it’s effective, proportionate and necessary.

It is impossible to have public discourse over things that are classified. That’s why we elect people to the Parliament.

Lord Strassberger commentary on the bill — this activity has been going on for years.

Drop Internet Connections Records — intelligence agencies oppose this. Targeted requests, targeted to service providers. Lots of potential for abuse. You’re not in the convienance business when you go into law enforcement. Also, technichally demanding.

• Filter requests for Internet Connection Records – the impact and cost implications. We should lay out the complexity in ensuring the filters and databases are secure. Here, we can re-use our argument that any database will become a target for hackers. We should cite the Russian Government’s activities here as an example (i.e. The Dukes and the recent DNC data breach).

“Communication Service Provider” not defined and could reach ICT industry that has traditionally not been part of the telecommunications service providers.

“Hostile to encryption” — you are not allowed to use encryption in a fashion that would prevent decryption. This would deny the right to use end-to-end encryption.

http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/investigatorypowers/stages.html